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BUSH AND OBAMA FIGHT TERRORISTS
OUTSIDE JUSTICE JACKSON'S TWILIGHT
ZONE

Afsheen John Radsan*

George W. Bush and Barack H. Obama have used
presidential powers in different ways. That is easy to say because
they have occupied the Oval Office at different times. Since the
fourth dimension of time affects the three dimensions of space,
the signing of the same executive order is not the same act.
Beyond that, parsing specific differences between Presidents is
difficult.
To explain the differences between Bush and Obama, one
might use metaphor, formulas, facts, or some combination. One
metaphor is to compare American Presidents to Odysseus from
Greek legend. One formula comes from Justice Jackson's
famous concurrence in the Steel Seizure Case. And one set of
facts relates to programs that involve the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Traveling from the abstract to the granular, my essay tries
to show that the gap in national security practices between
Bush's second year in office and his last year is far wider than
the gap between Bush's last year in office and Obama's first
year. (The shift between Bush I and Bush II is thus more radical
than the shift between Bush II and Obama I.) As to the use of
Predator strikes, irregular renditions, military commissions, the
state-secrets privilege, and a label from armed conflict that
allows long-term detention of suspected terrorists, there has
been surprising continuity between presidential administrations.
Obama has changed the packaging of aggressive programs more
than their contents.

*
Professor, William Mitchell College of Law. He thanks Benjamin Canine,
Knapp Fitzsimmons and Brian Schenk for their research assistance.
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THE METAPHOR
Homer can help explain Bush and Obama. In epic poetry,
Homer presented a strategy for dealing with beasts that caused
sailors to crash into rocks by the lure of sweet song.1 Odysseus,
following Circe's advice, ordered his crew to plug their ears with
wax and to tie him to the mast of their ship. By limiting
themselves in a minor way, by giving up some power, they hoped
to prevent themselves from being captured by Sirens. The
limitations, so they believed, led to their greater good. Odysseus,
rather than face Sirens on his own, sought assistance from his
crew. There was safety in numbers.
To apply Homer, one might compare how willing President
Bush was and how willing President Obama is to ask Congress,
the other elected branch, to limit presidential power. To what
extent do the two Presidents retreat from a full assertion of
inherent powers? No matter their political parties, all Presidents
seem to agree that there are some executive powers which do
not permit intrusion from Congress. Presidents Bush and
Obama, in this regard, have something in common. Congress,
they must be sure, cannot legislate away the President 's powers
to pardon offenders or to veto legislation. Those are two easy
examples.
Most observers agree that the core of presidential power
cannot be molested. Yet profound differences emerge when
general statements are applied at a more specific level. For each
President, one might ask how large that impenetrable core of
executive power really is. John Yoo, a former official in the Bush
Justice Department, offered one description. As for the CIA's
aggressive interrogations, Yoo said:
Congress can no more interfere with the President's conduct
of the interrogation of enemy combatants than it can dictate
strategic or tactical decisions on the battlefield. Just as
statutes that order the President to conduct warfare in a
certain manner or for specific goals would be
unconstitutional, so too are laws that seek to prevent the
President from gaining the intelligence he believes necessary
to prevent attacks upon the United States.2

1. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 148-53 (Robert Squillance ed., George H. Palmer
trans., Barnes & Noble Classics 2003).
2. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the
President (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU
GHRAIB 172, 207 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) .
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But John Yoo's description is not within the mainstream.3
Perhaps he and President Bush pushed things too far. President
Obama, for now, is not so pushy. He seems to see a smaller core
to presidential power.
Whether presidents agree with Professor Yoo or with his
critics, they do not always operate in a single mode. Categories
are purer in theory than in fact. Sometimes differences on
executive power blur when constitutional principles are adjusted
to circumstances beneath the clouds. The reality on the ground,
so to speak, has affected two presidents during their journeys in
office.
THE BUSH JOURNEY
During two terms in office, President Bush was not always
extreme in his national security practices. On programs that
related to the CIA, Bush showed two different faces. His
expression in the first term was harsher than in the second.
Right after the 9/1 1 attacks, President Bush turned to
Congress for some support. Congress passed an Authorization
for Use of Military Force that encouraged the President to use
"all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks."4 Later, President
Bush claimed the AUMF justified several actions in the fight
against terrorists.
First, the Bush Administration said the AUMF allowed
President Bush to detain an American citizen captured in
Afghanistan just after 9/1 1. A plurality of the court agreed with
him in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. 5 Second, Bush's advocates said the
3. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Setting the World Right, 115 YALE L.J. 2350, 2373
(2006) ("[T]he Constitution provides no single source for the President's various abilities
to promulgate agency regulations, to exercise prosecutorial discretion, and to conduct
foreign relations."); William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power
Inevitably Expands and Why it Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505, 521 (2008) (arguing, inter
alia, that executive branch precedents should not be seen as conclusive or even
necessarily persuasive in establishing constitutionality and that executive power can be
curbed by reforms that minimize secrecy and impose more accountability); Neal Kumar
Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branch from
Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2317 (2006) ("[T]he Founders assumed that massive changes
to the status quo required legislative enactments, not executive decrees. As that concept
has broken down, the risks of unchecked executive power have grown to the point where
dispatch has become a worn-out excuse for capricious activity.").
4. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (Supp. III 2003)).
5. See 542 U.S. 507, 508 (2004) (plurality opinion) (holding that President had the
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AUMF authorized the military commissions President Bush
established by executive order in Guantanamo. The Supreme
Court disagreed in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. 6 Third, the Bush
Administration said the A UMF justified the terrorist
surveillance program, that is, the monitoring of communications
without seeking warrants through the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act.7 This controversy did not reach the Supreme
Court. Instead, the TSP controversy was settled through
statutory amendments that, among other things, immunized
telecommunications companies that assisted government
surveillance.8
Soon after 9/1 1, Congress also passed the Patriot Act9 as a
sort of presidential wish list. As a result, it lowered the wall to
cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence
gathering. Congress allowed financial and other information to
be collected by national security letters-basically administrative
subpoenas. And it approved sneak and peek warrants.
Many Bush officials said robust executive power was
necessary to fight terrorists. Their common goal was power, but
they disagreed on how to obtain that power as 9/1 1 faded into
the country's past. One group believed President Bush should
rely on his Article II powers, alone, flexing the Commander-in
Chief Clause among other provisions. Another group believed
President Bush should seek more congressional support. Mindful
of Justice Jackson 's famous categories from the Steel Seizure
Case, this group reminded the extremists that the President's
power is at its maximum when Article II powers are combined
with everything Congress can delegate under Article I. For
them, this was better politics as much as it was a better legal
framework. They tried to shift the question from whether the
President had the power to do something to whether the Federal
Government did. Not all officials, of course, neatly fell into two
right to detain, but subject to "a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for
that detention").
6. See 548 U.S. 557 (2006) .
7 . Memorandum from the U . S . Dep't o f Justice o n Legal Authorities Supporting
the Activities of the Nat'l Sec. Agency Described by the President 3 (Jan. 19, 2006),
available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/nsa/dojnsal 1906wp. pdf ("Accordingly,
electronic surveillance conducted by the President pursuant to the AUMF, including the
NSA activities, is fully consistent with PISA and falls within category I of Justice
Jackson's framework.").
8. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-261, § 102(a), 122 Stat. 2436, 2459 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1812,
1881, 1881g, 1885, 1885c (2008)) .
9 . Pub. L . No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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groups. But for the sake of illustration, I propose David
Addington as a representative for the first group and Jack
Goldsmith for the second group.
Addington was Vice President Cheney's legal adviser, and
later became Cheney's chief of staff. Addington 's tenure with
the Bush Administration is often attributed to extending
executive power to unprecedented levels.10 Under Addington,
the Bush Administration was hostile to Congress and largely
unconcerned with the Supreme Court.11 Addington himself was
quoted as saying, "[w]e're going to push and push and push until
some larger force makes us stop. "12
Goldsmith was the head of the Justice Department 's Office
of Legal Counsel for part of 2004. Opposed to Addington,
Goldsmith advocated congressional approval of controversial
executive actions. He called for Congress 's "explicit help " on
detentions and military commissions.13 Goldsmith rooted his
beliefs in Justice Jackson's articulation of executive power being
"at its maximum " when the President acts "pursuant to an
express or implied authorization of Congress. "14 Goldsmith saw
congressional approval as necessary for placing counterterrorism
policies "on a solid legal foundation."15
From 2002 until 2006, the Bush Administration did not seek
much from Congress or many adjustments in statutes. Letting
things be, the Administration did not get close to a framework
statute to cover the details in the fight against terrorists:
detention, interrogation, transfers, and trials. For a while,
Addington prevailed.
Once the country's mood changed, the courts entered the
breach. Hamdan, concerning the legality of military commissions
at Guantanamo, was a clear setback for Addington and a
vindication for Goldsmith. The Supreme Court held that
commissions, established on nothing more than the President's
10. See Robert D. Sloane, The Scope of Executive Power in the Twenty-First
Century: An Introduction, 88 B.U. L. REV 341, 343-46 (2008) (describing the debate over
the "Unitary Executive" theory and the Bush Administration's post-9/11 expansion of
Presidential authority).
11. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 126 (2007) (describing
Addington's belief that presidential power was coextensive with presidential
responsibility).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 123.
14. Id. (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
15. GOLDSMITH, supra note 11, at 123.
.
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November 13, 2001 order, violated the Uniform Code of Military
Justice and, by the UCMJ's link to the laws of armed conflict,
also violated Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.16 It
took the Hamdan setback in 2006 to cause the White House to
go back to Congress with hat in hand. As a result, the Military
Commissions Act was passed in October 2006.17 Curiously,
Obama, as a Senator, voted against this grant of power to
President Bush.18 The MCA was a partial framework statute,
covering military trials and interrogation standards. Goldsmith,
gone from the government, prevailed. The War Crimes statute
was retroactively amended to only include "grave breaches" of
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. And the
President, in a CIA exception, was given the leeway to approve
interrogation tactics below torture but beyond what was
permitted to the Department of Defense and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. These tactics were outlined in
Executive Order 13,440, issued on July 20, 2007 as well as the
classified supplement to the executive order.19
After that, an impatient Bush counted his final days in
office as the country looked forward to the presidential
transition. Easily drawn into the power of positive thinking,
many people started to join the chant of "Yes, we can." Already
in place for them, whether they acknowledged it or not, were
some reasonable programs at the CIA.
THE OBAMA JOURNEY
To differ from Bush's journey in significant terms, Obama
could have insisted on transparency and accountability from the
CIA and the rest of the intelligence community. Obama could
have steered away from the laws of armed conflict and
abbreviated process; to please civil libertarians in his coalition,
16. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 613 ("The UCMJ conditions the President's use of military
commissions on compliance not only with the American common law of war, but also
with the rest of the UCMJ itself, insofar as applicable, and with the 'rules and precepts of
the law of nations,' including, inter alia, the four Geneva Conventions signed in 1949. The
procedures that the Government has decreed will govern Hamdan's trial by commission
violate these laws.") (citations omitted).
17. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
18. 109 CONG. REC. Sl0,388 (2006), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi
bin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2006_record&page=Sl0388&position=all ("Let me take a few
minutes to speak more broadly about the bill before [the Senate] . . . . The problem with
this bill is not that it is too tough on terrorists. The problem with this bill is that it is
sloppy. And the reason it is sloppy is because we rushed it to serve political purposes
instead of taking the time to do the job right.").
19. Exec. Order No. 13,440, 72 Fed. Reg. 40,707 (Jul. 20, 2007).
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he could have moved toward the criminal justice system and full
due process for handling suspected terrorists. But, so far under
Obama, a major shift on CIA programs has not occurred.
Less than two years into Obama's first term, there is not as
much to report about his executive actions. National security is
not at the top of his agenda since the financial bailout and
health-care reform have taken up the new administration's time.
On CIA-related policies, President Obama has not made much
progress on a framework statute. And he has talked less than
President Bush about an executive override of statutes, whether
in presidential signing statements or in other places. As one shot
over the CIA's deck, however, he did allow Attorney General
Eric Holder to reopen a criminal investigation about alleged
abuses that occurred in the CIA's detention and interrogation
program during the Bush Administration.
For Obama, the Military Commissions Act (in an updated
version in 2009) stands as his compass on national security.20
Even so, Captain Obama cleared out a few things that Captain
Bush had left on deck. On January 22, 2009, Obama closed the
CIA's secret prisons, eliminated the CIA exception for
interrogations, and imposed a uniform interrogation standard
across the government.21 Yet he did these things by executive
order rather than by statute. So if Obama changes his mind
about secret prisons and the uniform standard, he does not need
Congress's permission. He could make those changes in the
stroke of a pen, a possibility hinted at in the executive order
which states that Obama's Special Task Force, "if warranted,"
should "recommend any additional or different guidance for
other departments or agencies. "22
20. See Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § § 1801-1807, 123
Stat. 2574 (2009), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/2009%20MCA %20Pub%
20%20Law%20111-84.pdf; Warren Richey, Obama Endorses Military Commissions for
Guantanamo Detainees, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 29, 2009, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2009/1029/p02s01 -usju.htrnl ("In signing the
National Defense Authorization Act on Wednesday, President Obama has personally
endorsed yet another attempt by the US government to conduct military-commission
trials of terror suspects currently held at the Guantanamo detention camp.").
21. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,893 (Jan. 22, 2009).
22. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Special Task Force on Interrogations and
Transfer Policies Issues Its Recommendations to the President (Aug. 24, 2009), available
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/August/09-ag-835.html ("The Executive Order
directed the Task Force to study and evaluate 'whether the interrogation practices and
techniques in Army Field Manual 2-22.3, when employed by departments and agencies
outside the military, provide an appropriate means of acquiring the intelligence necessary
to protect the Nation, and, if warranted, to recommend any additional or different
guidance for other departments or agencies."').
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If Obama is duplicitous, he could keep any renewal of secret
prisons and aggressive interrogations hidden from those without
a "need to know." He might argue to himself (and to an inner
core of advisers with security clearances) that it would hurt
national security-by undercutting support both at home and
abroad-if everyone knew the dirty truth of what is done for
security. Quite charming, Obama may be better than Bush in
hiding truth from the country. However Captain Obama steers
the ship of state, the winds behind him will be strong when he
combines executive prerogative with the presidential power to
classify information.
If President Obama were truly interested in the
fundamentals of the country 's counterterrorism policies-things
that would last longer than one or two presidential terms-he
would try to lock changes into place by statute. As President, he
could propose new legislation. Undoing statutes, of course,
would require majority votes in Congress plus the President's
signature, or two-thirds votes from both houses of Congress to
override a presidential veto. To be more of an Odysseus,
President Obama should seek more statutes. At this stage in his
journey, the current binds do not tie him very tightly-if at all.
On two different journeys, the Military Commissions Act
strapped both President Bush and President Obama. Bush, who
resisted Congress during the middle years of his presidency, did
not seem as happy to be strapped to the ship as Obama does.
Looks, of course, can be deceiving. President Obama's smile
may mask duplicity on the CIA's business of espionage and
covert action. How much you like that duplicity depends on the
extent you believe secrecy and democracy can co-exist.
THE FORMULA
The facts about executive power require context to be
meaningful. For additional insights into Bush and Obama, one
might look back to the canon of United States Supreme Court
cases. In the Steel Seizure Case,23 Justice Jackson acknowledged
the lack of useful models "to concrete problems of executive
power as they actually present themselves. "24 Instead of offering
an analogy to ancient Greece, Jackson drew on the Old
Testament, saying that the answers to executive power "must be
23. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
concurring) .
24. Id. at 634.

v.

Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
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divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph
was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh. "25 Other than that,
Jackson suggested that the authorities on executive power, over
the course of history, have cancelled themselves out. In place of
metaphor (or as another metaphor), Jackson offered his three
famous categories. Category one is when the President has
express or implied consent from Congress. Category three is
when Congress has expressed or implied its disagreement with
the President. And category two is when Congress is poised
between categories one and three. Since then, courts and
scholars are more likely to use Jackson's categories than to apply
analogies from ancient Greece, the Old Testament-or from
some other source.
Even when courts are not explicit about the Jackson
categories, commentators use them to come back to cases about
executive power. John Roberts, for example, stated during his
confirmation hearings to become Chief Justice that the Jackson
formula is best for solving problems about executive power. In
response to Senator Feingold's question about how Roberts
would have analyzed the President's authority to detain a United
States citizen as an enemy combatant (an issue earlier before the
Court in Hamdi), Roberts replied: "My understanding of the
appropriate approach in this area is that it is the Youngstown
analysis, the one sent forth in Justice Jackson's concurring
opinion. And I think that is the most appropriate way to flesh
out the issues. "26 The Hamdi decision, however, showed that
Supreme Court Justices were less explicit about the Steel Seizure
Case than the nominee about to join them as Chief Justice.
Other lawyers have also forgotten Jackson's categories. One
of the many criticisms leveled against John Yoo's analysis of the
legality of CIA interrogations was his failure to mention
25. Id.
26. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
243 (2005 ) , available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname
=109_senate_hearings&docid=f:23539.wais.pdf. Similarly, in response to Senator Leahy's
inquiry as to whether the President could override a congressional ban on torture,
Roberts stated: "there often arise issues where there's a conflict between the Legislature
and the Executive over an exercise of Executive authority - asserted Executive authority.
The framework for analyzing that is in the Youngstown Sheet and Tube case, the famous
case coming out of President Truman's seizure of the steel mills." Id.at 152. When Leahy
asked if Youngstown is settled law, Roberts responded, "I think the approach in the case
is one that has guided the court in this area since 1954 or 1952, whatever it was . . .
Youngstown is a very important case in a number of respects." Id.at 153. Roberts went
on to state that Justice Jackson is one of the Justices he most admires. Id.
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Jackson 's categories.27 To many, Yoo had committed heresy.
Only a former or current law professor, it seems, would be
stupid enough or brave enough to disagree with the Chief Justice
about Jackson's importance.
It is not clear whether Yoo forgot the Jackson categories or
chose not to apply them in his work for the Office of Legal
Counsel. Either way, to the extent Yoo challenges the usefulness
of these simple categories, I join him in here.sy. To me, the
Jackson categories tend toward meaninglessness . The twilight
zone, albeit a nice title for a television program, is not so distinct
from categories one and three, and the poor threads to the
categories clash with the rich tapestry of American constitutional
law.
JACKSON APPLIED IN HAMDI
To analyze executive power under Bush and Obama, three
categories may be more than necessary to the judiciary's binary
decisions on whether or not a President can take certain actions.
Because courts do not usually declare a tie between the parties
to a dispute, Jackson's categories are too complicated. At the
same time, because three categories may not be enough to
explain all the nuances to the Constitution, Jackson's categories
are too simplistic. Whether the categories prove too much or too
little, judges and academics seem to indulge the Jackson
categories for old time's sake.
For judges, interpreting whether a statute helps or hurts the
President is often very difficult. In Hamdi, the Steel Seizure Case
was a looming presence. Justice O 'Connor, for example,
believed the AUMF helped President Bush and satisfied the
Non-Detention Act:
[I]t is of no moment that the AUMF does not use specific
language of detention. Because detention to prevent a
combatant's return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident
of waging war, in permitting the use of "necessary and

27. Harold Hongju Koh, Dean of Yale Law School, Statement Before the Senate
Judiciary Comm. regarding the Nomination of the Hon. Alberto R. Gonzales as Att'y
Gen. of the U.S. 4,7 (Jan. 7, 2005), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/
pdf/KohTestimony.pdf. ("Nevertheless, in my professional opinion, the August 1, 2002
OLC Memorandum is perhaps the most clearly erroneous legal opinion I have ever read .
. . . In a stunning failure of lawyerly craft, the August 1, 2002 OLC Memorandum
nowhere mentions the landmark Supreme Court decision in Youngstown Steel & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, where Justice Jackson's concurrence spelled out clear limits on the
President's constitutional powers. ) .
"
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appropriate force," Congress has clearly and unmistakably
authorized detention in the narrow circumstances considered
here.28

Justice Souter, by contrast in the same case, did not believe
the A UMF was specific enough to serve as an Act of Congress to
displace the NDA. For multiple reasons, Souter read the NDA
"to require clear congressional authorization before any citizen
can be placed in a cell. "29 Souter stated:
[The] focus [of the AUMF] is clear, and that is on the use of
military power. It is fairly read to authorize the use of armies
and weapons, whether against other armies or individual
terrorists. But . . . it never so much as uses the word detention,
and there is no reason to think Congress might have
perceived any need to augment Executive power to deal with
dangerous citizens within the United States, given the well
stocked statutory arsenal of defined criminal offenses
covering the gamut of actions that a citizen sympathetic to
terrorists might commit.30

Yes, the Jackson categories do help explain the difference
between Justice O'Connor and Justice Souter in one case. Their
debate in Hamdi, after all, can be reduced to a debate between
two of the three Jackson categories. Justice O'Connor, who said
the AUMF satisfied the requirement for congressional action in
the NDA, put President Bush in category one. Justice Souter, on
the other hand, said the A UMF was not specific enough to
satisfy the NDA, putting President Bush in category three. Yet
neither Justice O'Connor nor Justice Souter was explicit about
the Jackson category she or he applied.
None of the Justices in Hamdi, however, placed the case in
category two. Category two, in Hamdi or in other cases, is not so
useful. It draws snickers from students. It reminds some of
Johnny Cash's song about walking the line. And movie buffs
connect the category to Marlon Brando's character in
Apocalypse Now who dreamed to see a snail slither on the blade
of a straight-edge razor-and survive. For many, Jackson's
second category is not much more than colorful verbiage.

28. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004).
29. Id. at 543.
30. Id. at 547. Although Justice Souter did not believe the Court needed to go
beyond the statutory language of the NDA and AUMF, he stated that Justice Jackson's
Youngstown concurrence was "instructive," noting that "Presidential authority is 'at its
lowest ebb' where the President acts contrary to congressional will. " Id. at 552 (quoting
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 636-38).
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MY T AKE ON THE CATEGORIES

Judges and academics who use the Jackson categories tend
to pass over the finer points Justice Jackson himself made clear.
If President Bush or Obama is in category one, with express or
implied authorization from Congress, that does not mean he
always wins. Some actions are not permitted to the Federal
Government. Judges, when "justiciable " controversies reach the
court, must tell us which ones. Similarly, the President does not
always lose in category three. There, his power is at its lowest
ebb, but, as John Yoo hinted in his OLC memorandum, judges
(and Presidents Bush and Obama) must tell us when Congress
has gone too far.
Jackson's intermediate category, in which it is not clear
whether Congress is for Bush or against Obama, is of little use to
courts in deciding cases about executive power. The decision
about executive power, no matter the facts to the case or
controversy, turns out to be binary for the courts: either the
executive action is sustained or it is overruled. An equipoise in
which Congress is neither for the President nor against him has
theoretical importance (and perhaps academic importance), but
it is not where cases are decided in the real world. Principled
judges may work up through the categories to reach a result,
category one for the President or category three against him. Or
results-oriented judges, whether or not they are transparent in
their written opinions, may back their decisions into the
categories.
Justice Stevens, in his Hamdan opinion, gives short shrift to
the important point that the President does not always lose in
category three. About all he has to say on this point is contained
in a short footnote: "Whether or not the President has
independent power, absent congressional authorization, to
convene military commissions, he may not disregard limitations
that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own powers, placed
on his powers."31 Justice Stevens, of course, stacks the deck in his
favor by assuming a "proper exercise " of congressional power.32
For this conclusion, he cites the Steel Seizure Case and then
springs a trap from Hamdan's oral argument: "The Government

31.
637).
32.

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 n.23 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at
Id.
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does not argue otherwise. "33 But this is what the government's
counsel actually said:
Congress has repeatedly recognized and sanctioned [the
authority of the executive branch to try enemy combatants by
military commissions] . Indeed, each time Congress has
extended the jurisdiction of the court-martials [sic], Congress
was at pains to emphasize that that extension did not come in
derogation of the jurisdiction of military commissions. And in
its most recent action, Congress clearly did not operate as
somebody who viewed the military commissions as ultra vires.
They offered no immediate review, and no review at all for
charges resulting in a conviction of less than 10 years. 34

That does not mean Congress could have done anything it
wanted in the UCMJ. There are some constitutional limits on
congressional action. Whether for John Yoo or Justice Stevens,
for George Bush or Barack Obama, there must be some areas of
presidential power onto which Congress may not intrude. This,
to repeat, is an initial premise to my essay.
Back to my focus on the CIA, not only do I question the
usefulness of Jackson's categories on issues of executive power, I
challenge whether Congress is a significant check on intelligence
activities.35 More promising as checks on the intelligence
community are the patrolling entities within the executive
branch: the lawyers, the inspectors general, and the review
boards within the clandestine service. Internal checks, in other
words, are more effective than external checks on the CIA's
manifestations of executive power. Congress's express or implied
approval of intelligence activities, whether by appropriations or
by more specific statutes, is superficial compared to deeper
trends within the executive branch. In a sort of paradox,
however, the most important checks are the most difficult to
measure; empirical data on the CIA's Office of General
Counsel, the Office of Inspector General, and the Accountability
Review Boards are thin-and often classified. This paradox
applies to both Presidents Bush and Obama.
So while Congress is not irrelevant, the importance of the
congressional variable should not be overstated in the
presidential formula. An academic's familiarity with the Jackson
categories does not make them always relevant to reality.
33.
34.
35.
General

Id.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No . 05-184).
See A. John Radsan, Sed Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes: The CIA's Office of
Counsel?, 2 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 201 (2008).
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Internal checks are much more important than the Jackson
categories in understanding how Presidents Bush and Obama
ensure that intelligence activities stay effective and legal .
FAVORABLE TAKES ON THE CATEGORIES

Chief Justices are not the only people who find Jackson's
categories appropriate for analyzing executive power . The legal
academy, for so long, has favored the categories as providing a
useful, and to some, an ingenious method for analyzing
complicated problems of constitutional law. As Obama (the
constitutional law professor turned President) must know, many
casebooks on American constitutional law �lace great emphasis
on Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown. 6 Not only are the
categories imposed on first and second-year law students, many
respected scholars flock to the Jackson camp in their writings
about executive power. They are unwilling to join the heresy.
For various reasons, they relish the Jackson categories . Even so,
because it is easy to shun disbelievers, they do not spend too
much ink on something taken for granted.
Erwin Chemerinsky, for one, argues that "[t]he Constitution
is based on a simple vision of shared and separated powers. "37 At
the core of this system are the Constitution's checks and
balances. In fact, even "areas of seemingly unilateral executive
authority must be understood as part of an overall system of
checks and balances. "38 "For almost every major government
action," Chemerinsky argues, "at least two branches of
government should have to be involved. "39 Chemerinsky believes
that, in light of this system of checks and balances, Jackson's
categories are appropriate for analyzing the constitutionality of
executive actions.40 Jackson's concurrence is a "[t]raditional

36. Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown's Shadow, 19 CONST.
COMMENT. 87, 88 (2002) ( citing, as examples, ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 232 (2001 ) ; JESSE H. CHOPER, ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 114 ( 2001 );
DANIEL A. FARBER, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 917 (2d
ed. 1997) ; GEOFFREY R. STONE, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 392 ( 3d ed. 1996);
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN AND GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 333 ( 14th
ed. 2001 )) .
37. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assault on the Constitution: Executive Power and the
War on Terrorism, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 4 ( 2006) .
38. Id. at 5. Chemerinsky describes this approach to government power as "both
simplistic and elegant." Id.
39. Id. at 4.
40. See id. at 5-6.
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discussion[] of presidential power " that "recognized this basic
constitutional framework."41
Chemerinsky, fairer than Justice Stevens, acknowledges that
"there are some areas where the Constitution assigns power to
only one branch, unchecked by any other."42 Jackson's first
category, as Chemerinsky presumes, appropriately addresses
these areas. Chemerinsky also recognizes Jackson's second
category, the "zone of twilight " in which the President and
Congress may have concurrent, often uncertain authority.43 And
the third category is a "formulation . . . consistent with a system
that values shared powers and checks and balances."44
Like Chemerinsky, former Yale Law School Dean Harold
Hongju Koh believes Jackson's framework is appropriate for
analyzing our system of checks and balances. Koh, however, is
even more enthusiastic than Chemerinsky in praising Jackson:
A number of scholars have posited a theory of the "unitary
executive," the notion that the President has independent
power to control the executive branch and to resist
infringements upon the prerogatives of his office. But the
Constitution provides no single source for the President' s
various abilities t o promulgate agency regulations, t o exercise
prosecutorial discretion, and to conduct foreign relations. As
Justice Jackson famously wrote in his Youngstown
concurrence, "Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate,
depending on their disjunction . . . with those of Congress."
The very point of a constitutional system of checks and
balances is to separate and divide powers and to foster
internal checks within each branch by recognizing multiple
sources of enumerated authority operating in a number of
different subject matter areas. The genius of Justice Jackson's
Youngstown analysis rests in its acknowledgement of multiple
sources of executive power, rather than implying that all
executive actions automatically enjoy heightened deference
because they spring from a wellspring of a completion power
located somewhere in Article 11.4

41. Id.
42. Id. at 4. Chemerinsky mentions the President's power to pardon. Id.
43. Id. at 6. Chemerinsky goes on to argue that four approaches may be adopted in
analyzing the second category, three of which stress the Constitution's system of checks
and balances. Id. Although an interesting endeavor, his examination of the second
category is not relevant for our purposes. Suffice to say that Chemerinsky accepts
Jackson's concurrence as an acceptable Constitutional tool.
44. Id. at 6.
45. Harold Hongju Koh, Setting the World Right, 115 YALE L.J. 2350, 2373 (2006).
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From a law professor, there may be no higher praise than
"genius " to describe an analytic framework. Happy with
Jackson, Koh addresses the Supreme Court's decision in
Hamdan, concluding that "Hamdan proves again that Justice
Jackson's tripartite structure in Youngstown is sufficiently
flexible to permit robust executive action when Congress
genuinely approves, while constraining executive action against
the will of Congress. "46 In simple terms, Koh seemed happy
when George W . Bush lost court cases about executive power.
Similar to Koh, Neal Katyal and Laurence Tribe accept
Justice Jackson's "now-canonical categories that guide modern
analysis of separation of powers. "47 Katyal and Tribe explain why
Jackson's categories are appropriate for analyzing the
President's power:
Justice Jackson's articulation of the constitutional limits upon
the commander-in-chief power makes good structural sense:
Congress alone can see the problem whole; the Chief
Executive tends to be blinded by the single-minded
requirements of his military mission, and courts necessarily
see but one case at a time and in wartime tend to defer to the
executive 's assumed greater knowledge and expertise,
coupled with the executive 's electoral legitimacy. For such
reasons, the President should not be permitted, simply by
donning his military garb, to do in this country what he could
. dress.48
never do m
. mere1y executive

Of the various presidential powers, Katyal and Tribe seem most
concerned with the Commander-in-Chief Clause. For that subset
of questions about executive power, they consider the Jackson
categories ideal. "In discussing the limits of the President's
power within these three zones, " Katyal and Tribe explain,
"Justice Jackson leveled a forceful warning against unilateral
assertions of the commander-in-chief power in the name of
national security."49 They continue:
Justice Jackson read in the Constitution's text and design, as
illuminated by relevant history, a prohibition against giving
the President the unilateral power to define such a state of
war or to act as though he had . Thus, the President's
commander-in-chief power is not such an absolute as might be
46.
47.
Military
48.
49.

Id.
Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the
Tribunals, 1 1 1 YALE L.J. 1259, 1274 (2002).
Id. at 1275.
Id. at 1274.
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implied from that office in a militaristic system but is subject
to limitations consistent with a constitutional Republic whose
law and policy-making branch is a representative Congress . . .
. No penance would ever expiate the sin against free
government of holding that a President can escape control of
executive powers by law through assuming his military role. 50

With an implicit emphasis on Jackson's third category, Katya!
and Tribe praise Jackson's framework for illustrating the
inherent danger in a President's claim to unbridled power from
Commander-in-Chief authority during times of actual or
imagined military conflict.51 Centuries after the Constitution's
ratification, they are less concerned about a system that might
not give a President-call him Bush or Obama-enough power
to protect the nation's security. In so many words, they favor
Goldsmith over Addington in the debates that existed during the
Bush Administration about executive power. They, too, were
happy when a Republican President lost in court.
Not everyone else who embraces the Jackson categories can
be named here.52 Our space is small. Suffice to say that the
academics climb over each other in heaping praise on dear
Jackson. Repetition makes them all happy.
Besides Jackson's proponents, one can identify a separate
group of agnostics who accept Jackson's categories as settled
law. In fact, the maj ority of scholars may actually fall into this
50. Id. at 1274-75.
51. In explaining congressional checks on the President's control of military
matters, Justice Jackson stated: "There are indications that the Constitution did not
contemplate that the title Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy will constitute him
also Commander in Chief of the country, its industries and its inhabitants. He has no
monopoly of 'war powers,' whatever they are. While Congress cannot deprive the
President of the command of the army and navy, only Congress can provide him an army
or navy to command. It is also empowered to make rules for the 'Government and
Regulation of land and naval forces,' by which it may to some unknown extent impinge
upon even command functions." Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 643-44.
52. See, e.g., Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, 29
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 373, 410 (2002) ( " [T] he concurrence might be the most lucid,
straightforward exposition on the remarkable dearth of very clear and useful legal
authority which applies to concrete issues that involve executive power as the questions
manifest themselves in practice." ) ; Saby Ghoshray, False Consciousness and Presidential
War Power: Examining the Shadowy Bends of Constitutional Curvature, 49 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 165, 173 (2009) ( "Scholars agree . . . that Justice Jackson's tripartite
framework is one of the most resilient and workable frameworks to evaluate the
constitutionality of executive actions." ) ; Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of the Judicial
Opinion, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 187, 202 (Peter
Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) ( " [The concurrence is] the most truly intellectually
satisfying . . . opinion in our two-hundred-year constitutional history." ) ; ABRAHAM D.
SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS 382
n.18 (1976) ( describing Justice Jackson's opinion as "deservedly famous" ) .
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category.53 Yet, in taking the categories at face value, they offer
at least tacit approval of Jackson's framework.54 Because they
tend to accept the framework by a simple citation to Jackson's
concurrence, their statements add little to the debate. The ones
who contest the usefulness of Jackson's categories, different
from true believers and agnostics, are an isolated minority.
MORE UNFAVORABLE TAKES

Not all scholars, however, are quite so enamored with
Jackson's categories. Before me, a few brave voices criticized the
three categories and called into question Jackson's exalted
status. An early dissenter in the academy was Edward Corwin,
who challenged both the majority and concurring decisions in
the Steel Seizure Case. Corwin concluded that "Justice Jackson's
rather desultory ·opinion contains little that is of direct
pertinence to the constitutional issue. "55 Summarizing the
concurring opinions, Corwin said they did not "contribute
anything to the decision's claim to be regarded seriously as a
doctrine of constitutional law."56 This, in conjunction with his
view of the majority opinion as "a purely arbitrary construct
created out of hand for the purpose of disposing of this
particular case, and . . . altogether devoid of historical
verification, " led Corwin to predict that " Youngstown will
probably go down in history as an outstanding example of the sic
volo, sic jubeo 57 frame of mind into which the Court is
occasionally maneuvered by the public context of the case
53. Chemerinsky, best understood, may fall into this category since he does not go
out of his way to describe why he favors Jackson's approach over other approaches. In
the Teacher's Manual to the third edition of his casebook, he is more candid than
elsewhere: "Justice Jackson's tripartite analysis of presidential power is very famous and
very frequently cited, but I've never found it terribly helpful."
54. See, e.g. , Sapna Desai, Genocide Funding: The Constitutionality of State
Divestment Statutes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 669, 702 (2009) (relying upon Jackson's
categories in analysis) ; LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 94-96 (2d ed. 1 996) ( stating that Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in
Youngstown "has become a starting point for constitutional discussion of concurrent
powers." ) ; Brett M. Kavanaugh, Separation of Powers During the Forty-Fourth
Presidency and Beyond, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1454, 1479 (2009) ( "Jackson's three-part
framework from his concurrence in Youngstown . . . has long been used to assess whether
a President's activities in the national security arena are permissible." ) ; Kevin M. Stack,
The Reviewability of the President's Statutory Powers, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1171, n.3 (2009)
( "The Supreme Court has embraced Justice Jackson's framework as the grounding
structure for review of the President's actions." ) .
55. Edward S. Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw, 53
COLUM. L. REV. 53, 63 (1953).
56. Id. at 64.
57. Translating to "I want this, I order this." In other words: "arbitrary."
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before it. "58 Although Corwin should be applauded for taking on
the Court, it cannot be said more than fifty years later that
Jackson's concurrence has been written off as an arbitrary
product with no useful guidance on constitutional law. That
prediction Corwin got wrong. Today many people-judges,
academics, and others-use Jackson to understand presidential
power. The substance of Corwin's critique, however, is still solid.
Modern commentators who criticize Jackson's tripartite
scheme argue, as I have, that the framework is far too simple.
Saby Ghoshray, for example, says that Jackson's system "would
have worked perfectly had the Constitution been of straight
forward Newtonian design. Under this framework, the three
discrete scenarios of Justice Jackson would neatly fit within the
conceptualized framework with its carefully balanced counter
forces combating the forces, along the way providing bullet
proof checks and balances."59 But constitutional law is not so
neat. As Ghoshray and many others know, it is rife with
"uncertainties and complexities,"60 "continuously shaping,
evolving, and structuring based on the existing circumstances. "61
In sum, while Jackson' categories are easy to work with, they are
of limited value for understanding a complex, non-linear system
with more than three basic patterns.62 The categories have even
less to say about the CIA under Presidents Bush and Obama.
Another criticism of Jackson is that, contrary to assertions
from Chemerinsky, Koh, and others, a framework by which
Congress can increase and decrease the President's power
through its own action or inaction undermines our system of
checks and balances.63 Martin Redish and Elizabeth Cisar
explain:
Justice Jackson's assumption that the executive branch's
power may be either augmented or decreased by
congressional addition or subtraction - a type of
congressional additur and remittitur-is valid in the narrow
sense that if Congress has exercised its legislative power
directing or authorizing implementation or enforcement, the
President is expressly obligated by Article II to "execute"
58. Corwin, supra note 55 at 64.
59. Ghoshray, supra note 52, at 205.
60. Id. at 21 1.
61. Id. at 205-06.
62. Id. at 205.
63. Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "If Angels Were to Govern": The Need
for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 485-86
(1991). Redish and Cisar refer to this theory as Jackson's "cumulative effects theory." Id.
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those laws, a power to act that the President would lack in the
absence of such legislation. Beyond that limited usage,
however, Justice Jackson' s "cumulative effects" theory makes
neither textual nor theoretical sense. 64

To the chagrin of Redish and Cisar, Jackson would place a
situation in the first category even if the President's power under
Article II is questionable but Congress infuses the President with
some of its own Article I power.65 Even if Congress delegated
this power voluntarily, "such an approach effectively destroys
the 'separation' of branch powers: One branch would be
exercising power clearly marked for another branch. "66
Redish and Cisar acknowledge that "[i]t might be argued . . .
that as long as Congress has voluntarily chosen to convey its
power to the executive branch (an assumption of Justice
Jackson 's first category), no separation of powers violation has
occurred. "67 Congress, the argument goes, has essentially waived
its right to argue that a violation has occurred.68 In response,
Redish and Cisar argue:
But both theoretically and practically, this waiver analysis is
unacceptable . From the perspective of American political
theory, the concept of congressional waiver ignores the fact
that separation of powers protections were not inserted to
protect the other branches, but rather to protect the populace.
Thus, just as a litigant is not permitted to waive limitations on
a court's subject-matter jurisdiction because such limitations
are imposed to protect the system rather than the litigant, so
too should Congress not be authorized to waive systemic
protections of the electorate. From a practical perspective, the
waiver theory ignores the obvious possibility that Congress
may be controlled by the same party as the executive branch,
effectively reducing Congress 's check on the President . In
such a situation, the only means of assuring the prevention of
branch usurpation is by judicial enforcement of separation of
69
powers.

Even if other scholars have forgotten the people, Redish
and Cisar remind us that we are the Constitution's ultimate
power. Concerning the CIA and many other programs, we have
voice in the Preamble, the Tenth Amendment, and in many
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 486.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 486-87.
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other places. Redish and Cisar, to repeat, are concerned about a
situation in which the same political party controls the
presidency and Congress. They saw the possibility of a
triumvirate-call them Obama, Reid, and Pelosi-which is more
important and perhaps more dangerous than Jackson's three
categories.
SPECIFIC PROGRAMS
If metaphor and formula fail to provide a complete picture
of executive power under Bush and Obama, one can opt for
granular detail from newspapers and magazines. Although
Obama promised a clean break with Bush's national security
practices, not all that much has changed. On those policies that
relate to the CIA, Obama has repackaged Bush/Cheney policies,
adding different bows and ribbons around the contents inside.
To the dismay of supporters who expected him to be a civil
libertarian in all aspects of the fight against terrorists, President
Obama has often dealt with suspected terrorists through
something other than the criminal justice system's full due
process model. Whether or not Obama uses the rhetoric of war,
it is only the laws of armed conflict that explain and justify many
of his programs.
PREDATOR STRIKES

During the presidential campaign, to balance his apparent
softness in calling for an American withdrawal from Iraq,
Senator Obama signaled that he would be tougher than his
Republican opponent in going after terrorists in Afghanistan and
Pakistan.70 This is a promise President Obama has kept. To the
human rights community's chagrin, Obama has increased
Predator strikes on al-Qaeda and on Taliban targets in
Afghanistan and Pakistan.71
Although President Obama uses the phrase "war on terror"
less than President Bush did, the new President has outdone the
70. Merle D. Kellerhals, Jr., Obama Emphasizes Multilateral U.S. Foreign
Policymaking, AMERICA.GOV, Jul. 25, 2008, http://www.america.gov/st/usg-english/
2008/July/20080725162819dmslahrellek0.840069.html
("In
the
struggle
against
international terrorism, Obama said the focus of U.S. security efforts must be
Afghanistan and Pakistan, where he says al- Qaida's 'roots run deepest."').
71. See Jane Mayer, The Predator War, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 26, 2009 at 36
("During his first nine and a half months in office, [Obama] has authorized as many
CJ.A. aerial attacks in Pakistan as George W. Bush did in his final three years in
office.").
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prior President on this very aggressive program. Whether the
Predator strikes come from the Air Force or the CIA, they can
only be justified under international law if the United States is in
armed conflict or acting in self-defense against the non-state
targets. Harold Koh, having left Yale to join the Obama
Administration, conceded both these points in a March 2010
address to the American Society of International Law. The
criminal justice system does not tolerate this kind of killing.
Predator strikes under Obama have accompanied more
American troops on the ground in Afghanistan. The United
States, to be sure, is not at war with the governments in either
Afghanistan or Pakistan. Both those governments, somewhere
between armed conflict and law enforcement, are trying to root
out at least some parts of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in their
countries. The Afghan Taliban, of course, may not be the same
force as the Pakistani Taliban, which explains why the Afghan
and Pakistani governments differ in their assessments of the
threat from the two groups.
Whether the United States is clearing Predator strikes with
the Afghan and Pakistani governments is not clear. The
clearances, different from public statements after an attack, may
come from the foreign governments through private channels.
But if the United States is not seeking any clearance, these
strikes are arguably violations of state sovereignty-and
international law.
Missile strikes from the sky complicate gunfights on the
ground. The pilots who guide the Predators through remote
control should be using multiple sources of intelligence before
firing missiles against suspected terrorists. Although some critics
have questioned how accurately the pilots distinguish
combatants from civilians,72 very few have directly challenged
the legality of what has become "Obama's war." Democrats in
Congress seem less concerned about possible violations of
international law if their White House is committing them. That
is another fact of politics.

72. Mary Ellen O'Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of
Pakistan, 2004-2009 26 (Norte Dame Legal Studies Paper No. 09-43), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=l501 144 ("The U.S. cannot distinguish between civilians and
combatants with the reasonable [certainty] demanded by the principle of distinction. Nor
has the U.S. apparently taken the necessary precautions to protect civilian lives.").
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RENDITION

Fewer than six months into office, President Obama
announced that the rendition program would continue.73 This
program, started even before President Bush, involves the
transfer of suspected terrorists between jurisdictions without
complying with the elaborate procedures of extradition. So, on
rendition, Obama has chosen something other than full
transparency and accountability for the CIA.
Leon Panetta, toward the end of his confirmation hearing to
become Obama's CIA Director, signaled for the new President
that rendition would not be closed down.74 Even before the
President's announcement, however, Panetta's signal caused a
strong negative reaction from the human rights community.75 To
placate the civil libertarians, President Obama promised more
oversight on the rendition program. Obama's State Department
may play a larger role in negotiating assurances of proper
treatment of suspected terrorists from the receiving countries.
And outside observers including the International Committee of
the Red Cross may be brought in as monitors after transfer.
The checks and controls on the rendition program come
through executive orders and directives, not by statutes. On
rendition, President Obama is not interested in tying himself to
the mast of any ship. He is not interested in pursuing an idea
Vice President Eiden proposed back in the Senate: a statute
from Congress to bring in a judicial check on renditions. In 2007,
Senator Biden proposed the National Security with Justice Act
73. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, Remarks by the President on National
Security, (May 21, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
Remarks-by-the-President-On-N ational-Security-5-21-09/.
74. See Mark Mazzetti, Panetta Open to Tougher Methods in Some C. I. A.
Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2009, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/02/06/us/ politics/06cia.html ("Mr. Panetta also said the agency would continue the
Bush Administration practice of 'rendition' . . . . But he said the agency would refuse to
deliver a suspect into the hands of a country known for torture or other actions 'that
violate our human values."') . Earlier in the hearing, CIA Director Panetta stated that the
Obama Administration would not continue the program "because, under the executive
order issued by the [P]resident, that kind of extraordinary rendition, where we send
someone for the purposes of torture or for actions by another country that violate our
human values, that has been forbidden by the executive order." Newshour with Jim
Lehrer: CIA Nominee Panetta May Face Overhaul of Counterterrorism Measures (PBS
television broadcast Feb. 5, 2009), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/
j an-june09/cia_02-05.html.
75. See, e.g. Kenneth Roth, A Letter to CIA Director Panetta Regarding Diplomatic
Assurances Policy, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Feb. 26, 2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/
2009/02/26/letter-cia-director-panetta-regarding-diplomatic-assurances-policy ("We . . .
ask that you entirely disavow the practice of rendition to torture, both as it was carried
out during the Bush Administration, and as it was carried out in previous years.").
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by which the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act court would,
in secret, review executive determinations about whether a
"substantial likelihood" exists for believing the transfer would
lead to torture.76 Perhaps now that a Democrat runs the White
House, a check on rendition from the judicial branch is no longer
necessary. Or it may be a simple matter of packaging; because
Obama is friendlier than Cheney, the American people and the
international community may be more willing to accept Obama's
practices on the dark side. For any White House, marketing
matters.
M ILITARY COMMISSIONS
President Bush proposed military commissions as an
exception to criminal justice for handling the trials of suspected
terrorists. President Obama, again to the disappointment of his
civil libertarian base, hinted at more stuff from the dark side. In
a May 2009 speech, President Obama stated that "whenever
feasible, we will try those who have violated American criminal
laws . . . . Our courts and our juries, our citizens, are tough
enough to convict terrorists. . . . [D ]etainees who violate the laws
of war . . . are . . . best tried through military commissions. "77
Now the hints of the "yes-but " rhetoric have become truth.
The Obama Administration will use military commissions,
modified and arguably improved from Guantanamo, to handle
some terrorists. They have announced that they will use a
military commission, for example, on the alleged plotter of the
Cole bombing in Yemen, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri.78 On the
other hand, Obama's Justice Department said it would handle
the alleged 9/11 plotter, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), in
federal court in the Southern District of New York.79 To those
76. National Security with Justice Act, S. 1876, llOth Cong. § 104(a)(5) (2007),
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=llO_cong_bills&
docid=f:s 1876is. txt.pdf.
77. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security (May
21, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the
President-On-National-Security-5-21-09/.
78. Charlie Savage, Trial Without Major Witness Will Test Tribunal System, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 2009, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/01/
us/Olcole.html?_r=l ("Mr. Nashiri's case will be the marquee test of a new tribunal
system designed to handle terrorism suspects.").
79. Charlie Savage, U.S. to Try Avowed 911 1 Mastermind Before Civilian Court in
New York, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/l l/14/us/14terror.html ("The Obama Administration said Friday that it would
prosecute Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the self-described mastermind of the Sept. 11
attacks, in a Manhattan federal courtroom.").
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outside the White House, the rhyme and reason to President
Obama's decisions on who gets military justice and who gets
civilian justice are not so apparent. Politics are again at play.
Further, and more to the point of executive power, the
Obama Administration still relies on the enemy-combatant
category to justify military trials and the long-term detention of
some suspected terrorists. The Obama Administration, merely
changing labels under the Military Commissions Act of 2009,
calls these unfortunate souls "unprivileged enemy belligerents."
While the Bush Administration defined an "unlawful enemy
combatant " as someone who supported the Taliban or al-Qaeda,
the Obama Administration has modified its stance in litigation
to speak of "substantial " support.80 Adding an adjective makes a
difference on some cases, but, in an area where the President
retains ample discretion, the tweaking is not substantial change.
For some fronts in Obama's counterterrorism, the framework is
far more war than peace. The new Military Commissions Act
applies to those non-U.S. citizens who have engaged in
"hostilities" against the United States; have "purposely and
materially" supported those hostilities; or have joined al
Qaeda.81 Obama, like Bush, believes that membership in "al
Qaeda " is something that lends itself to meaningful definition.
Worse, President Obama did not make his self-imposed
deadline of closing Guantanamo as a detention center within a
year. Closing Guantanamo, it seems, is easier said than done. By
the time of the presidential transition, George Bush, Barack
Obama, and the vanquished candidate, John McCain, all agreed
that Guantanamo needed to be closed. The mess, of course, was
in the details. Despite Obama's charm and the new-found
willingness of countries to help the United States, not all
Guantanamo detainees can be transferred from United States
control in the snap of fingers. Nor can all those leftover in
Guantanamo easily be tried. As to the trial option, the
intelligence community knows transparent justice runs counter
to protecting legitimate intelligence sources and methods. The
80. Respondents' Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation,
Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH) (D.C. Cir. Mar. 13, 2009), available at http://
www.usdoj.govIopaldocuments/memo-re-det-auth. pdf.
81. Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 1801-1807, 123 Stat.
2574, 2575 (2009), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/2009%20MCA %20Pub%
20%20Law%20111-84.pdf ("The term 'unprivileged enemy belligerent' means an
individual . . . who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the
United States or its coalition partners.").
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heads of the various intelligence agencies are reminding
President Obama of this. Moreover, transferring suspected
terrorists to United States territory is a political gamble. Rahm
Emanuel, the President's chief of staff, knows that too.
Again, to the chagrin of civil libertarians, President Obama
is considering indefinite detention for those Guantanamo
detainees not easily handled by trial. Whether or not President
Obama finds the Jackson categories useful, he does not believe
he needs any additional support from Congress to justify this
detention. The former law professor hints that the A UMF plus
his presidential powers already provide him solid ground. So if
the trial of either al-Nashiri or KSM somehow results in a not
guilty verdict, the Obama Administration will be tempted to
hold them as captured belligerents for the duration of American
hostilities with al-Qaeda. That said, if President Obama transfers
any Guantanamo leftovers to United States territory, he may
actually seek congressional support. Continuing to hold them in
Cuba is one thing. Holding them in Illinois is quite another.
STATE-SECRETS PRIVILEGE

By this point in the journey it should come as no surprise
that President Obama, much like Captain Bush on his own ship,
also favors assertions of the state-secrets privilege as another
area of robust executive power. Obama's cabinet heads have not
shied away from asserting this privilege to protect sensitive
military, diplomatic, and intelligence information when the
United States is a party to a lawsuit or when the United States
intervenes in the lawsuit. The state-secrets privilege is just one of
several presidential prerogatives to keep things out of the public
spotlight. Other privileges include the right to classify and the
executive privilege to protect the confidences of those who
advise the President.
The Obama Administration, for example, continues to
assert the state-secrets privilege in a case in which a Boeing
subsidiary is being sued for its alleged role in the rendition
program.82 In Jeppesen, five non-U.S. citizens brought suit under
the Alien Tort Statute against Jeppesen Dataplan for providing
logistical and other services to the aircraft and the crews the CIA
allegedly used in transferring them within the rendition
program.83 A panel of the Ninth Circuit rejected the
82.
83.

See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, 579 F.3d 943 953-58 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 951.
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government's broad assertion of the state-secrets privilege as to
the "very subject matter " of the case, holding that the
government needed to conduct an item-by-item inventory of the
information to which the privilege applied.84 The appellate court
remanded to the district court for that inventory and for a
determination that the objected to evidence was essential to a
prima facie case.85 Before the remand, the Ninth Circuit took this
case up en bane and heard oral arguments in December 2009.86
The challenge against Boeing's subsidiary has gone farther
than Khaled el-Masri's lawsuit which alleged the CIA wrongfully
snatched him in Macedonia and then transferred him to
Afghanistan for harsh interrogation. In the Eastern District of
Virginia, Judge Ellis accepted the government's broad assertion
of the state-secrets privilege in the el-Masri case, and the Fourth
Circuit affirmed.87
Again, on state secrets President Obama has not sought to
involve Congress. Rather than support any congressional bills to
reform the privilege, the Obama Administration offered its own
reforms through a new Justice Department policy on September
23, 2009.88 Under this policy, heads of agencies are to assert the
privilege only in cases of "significant harm " to national security.
This is an executive &loss on the Supreme Court decision, United
States v. Reynolds,8 which first recognized the state-secrets
privilege. In that case, the head of any executive agency could
assert the privilege based on personal review of the facts. The
new Obama policy, adding some internal checks, sets up the
State Secrets Review Committee to coordinate assertions of the
privilege and requires the Attorney General to review all
proposed assertions.
President Obama 's maneuver on state secrets avoids a
difficult constitutional issue. If he and Congress were to pass
84. Id. at 955-58.
85. Id. at 962.
86. Bob Egelko, Torture Suit Too Hot to be Heard, U.S. Says, S.F. CHRONICLE,
Dec. 16, 2009, at C-1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/
c/a/2009/12/16/BA6H1B4L3P.DTL ("'The [Jeppesen] case cannot proceed without
getting into state secrets,' Justice Department lawyer Douglas Letter told an 11-judge
panel of the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco.").
87. El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 537 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff'd, 479 F.3d 296
(4th Cir. 2007) ("[T]here is no doubt that the state secrets privilege is validly asserted
here.").
88. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Attorney General
Establishes New State Secrets Policies and Procedures (Sept. 23, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.govIopa/pr/2009/September/09-ag-1013 .html.
89. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
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legislation that reformed the state-secrets privilege, they would
have to determine the underlying basis to the Reynolds decision.
If the basis is common law, there is ample room for statutory
refinement. But if the basis to the decision is the President's
inherent power, there is much less room in what Justice Jackson
calls his third category. An amendment to the Constitution
would be necessary.
President Obama's approach on state secrets, just as his
approach to Predator strikes and renditions, does not seem
unreasonable to me . In my view, the use of the state-secrets
privilege does not require an overhaul. Between Bush and
Obama, the three branches continue to work toward equilibrium
in this area of national security law.
OTHER DECISIONS

The lack of total transparency about CIA activities
disappoints Obama's supporters who expected a radical shift
toward open government under the new President . One should
be careful, however, not to overstate that everything has stayed
the same for the CIA under Obama . Packaging and nuances do
matter. And there were even a few victories for civil libertarians.
Civil libertarians must be happy with Obama's new
executive orders which say on close calls about classification,
executive officials should lean toward disclosure. One order
states: "If there is significant doubt about the need to classify
information, it shall not be classified.90 Another order directs
disclosure of presidential records unless specific materials are
identified which "may raise a substantial question of executive
privilege ."91 The revoked Bush executive order, by contrast,
instructed executive officials to err toward non-disclosure:
President may assert any constitutionally based privileges . . .
[which] subsume privileges for records that reflect: military,
diplomatic, or national security secrets (the state secrets
privilege); communications of the President or his advisors
(the presidential communications privilege); legal advice or
legal work (the attorney-client or attorney work product
privileges); and the deliberative processes of the President or

90. Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009).
91. See Exec. Order No. 13,489, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,669 (Jan. 21, 2009), available at
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-1712.pdf (titling the pertinent disclosure
section as "Notice of Intent to Disclose Presidential Records").

2010]

JUSTICE JA CKSON'S TWILIGHT ZONE

579

his advisors (the deliberative process privilege ).92

Plus, Obama seems more willing than Bush to declassify
documents. This transparency, of course, relates to abuses and
perceived abuses from the prior Administration. Obama, in fact,
may be less willing to declassify his own programs. In any event,
Obama's supporters must be happy with the level of detail
released to the public in the 2005 Office of Legal Counsel
memoranda on CIA interrogations and in the 2004 Special
Review by the CIA's Inspector General into Counterterrorism
Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 20010ctober 2003).93 These reports catalogued the CIA 's harsh
tactics on suspected terrorists, some approved, some not:
cramped
boxes
with
caterpillars,
sleep
deprivation,
waterboarding, cold-celling, stress positions, threats of sexual
assault or death of family members, the buzzing of a power drill,
cigar smoke, dousing with cold water, and a mock execution.
Before this, the Bush Administration had completely withheld
the 2005 OLC memos, and presented only a heavily redacted
version of the I G report in response to Freedom of Information
Act requests. President Obama, by contrast, has shined some
light on the dark side.
In another victory for civil libertarians, the Obama
Administration decided in February 2009 to transfer Ali Saleh
Kahlah al-Marri back to the criminal justice system.94 At the
change in presidential administrations, al-Marri's case was
pending in the Supreme Court, waiting for the Government 's
brief. Before the case reached the high court, al-Marri (a Qatari
in legal residence with his family in Peoria, Illinois) was arrested
as a "material witness" in the 9/11 investigations. Next, a grand
jury charged him with credit card fraud, among other crimes.
Then, in a surprise to the public, the Bush Administration
92. Exec. Order No. 13,233, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,025 (Nov. 1, 2001), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2001_register&docid=
fr05no01-104.pdf (citing the strong presumption for non-disclosure decided in Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977)) .
9 3 . Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, Records Show Strict Rules for CI.A.
Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/08/26/us/26prison.html ("The first news reports this week about hundreds of pages
of newly released documents on the C.l.A. program focused on aberrations in the field:
threats of execution by handgun or assault by power drill; a prisoner lifted off the ground
by his arms, which were tied behind his back; another detainee repeatedly knocked out
with pressure applied to the carotid artery.").
94. See Carrie Johnson, Terrorism Suspect Headed to U.S. Court, WASH. POST, Feb.
28, 2009, at A02, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2009/02/27IAR2009022701692.html.
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transferred him to a military brig in Charleston, South Carolina .
Under President Bush, the government's explanation for holding
al-Marri in a military brig was that he was an enemy combatant
feared to be part of an al-Qaeda cell.
Under President Bush, the reason for transferring al-Marri
from the criminal justice system to the military brig was not
clear. The evidence to prove the criminal case beyond a
reasonable doubt may not have been there. Or intelligence
sources and methods needed protection . Or indefinite detention
was preferred to a fixed sentence. Whatever Bush's reason for
the transfer out of the criminal justice system, the Obama
Administration negotiated a plea with al-Marri, rather than push
the Bush Administration's broad theory of executive power in
the case of a person arrested, without a gun, far from a
conventional battlefield. Al-Marri was therefore transferred
back to the custody of the Attorney General, and his guilty plea
mooted an important test of executive power in the Supreme
Court.95
In al-Marri's case, Obama showed self-control like
Odysseus. The plea bargain with al-Marri allowed the Qatari to
be removed from our country on the solid pillars of criminal law
and immigration law. Although these two pillars also cause
concerns for civil libertarians, they are not as controversial as
presidential power to hold people for the duration of a long,
shadow war.
Obama's retreat on al-Marri leaves the Hamdi decision as
the Supreme Court's most recent precedent on the President's
authority to detain enemy combatants. A plurality of the Court,
along with Justice Thomas, agreed that the AUMF passed after
9/11 gave President Bush the authority to detain a United States
citizen captured in Afghanistan in late 2001. President Obama
did not press any further. A newly constituted Court might have
backtracked from Hamdi.

95 . Memorandum from President Barack Obama, on Transfer of Detainee to
Control of the Att'y Gen. (Feb. 27, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_
press_office/Transfer-of-Detainee-to-Control-of-the-Attorney-General
("Accordingly,
by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United
States, I hereby direct [the Secretary of Defense] to transfer Mr. al-Marri to the control
of the Attorney General upon the Attorney General's request."); Terror Suspect Al
Marri Pleads Guilty, CBS
NEWS, Apr. 30, 2009, http://www.cbsnews.
com/stories/2009/04/30/national/main4981776.shtml ("Ali al-Marri, 43, admitted to one
count of conspiring to provide material support or resources to a foreign terrorist
organization.").
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Even the author of the Hamdi opinion, Justice O'Connor,
understood that the foundation to the President's authority
concerning an al-Qaeda partisan was not rock solid. "Certainly,
we agree that indefinite detention for the purpose of
interrogation is not authorized," she said.96 Relying on
"longstanding law-of-war principles," she argued that "[t]he
purpose of detention is to prevent captured individuals from
returning to the field of battle and taking up arms once again. "97
But she acknowledged that her understanding could fall apart
"[i]f the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely
unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development of
the law of war. "98
Al-Marri's case was tougher than Hamdi's. Obama and his
advisers saw that. Wiser than Bush, Cheney, Addington, and
company, Obama did not push to the point of backfire.
CONCLUSION
Although Odysseus and the Jackson categories are useful as
metaphors, they obscure the basic point that the White House
has more power on CIA programs when the President smiles.
President Obama-in carrying out an aggressive use of Predator
strikes, irregular renditions, military commissions, the state
secrets privilege, and long-term detention-understands this
point about the dark side to presidential power. Across the
executive branch, Obama's smile has replaced Cheney's scowl.

96.
97.
98.

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004).
Id. at 518.
Id. at 520.

